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Abstract 44 
The 2010 Desert RATS field test utilized two Space Exploration Vehicles (prototype planetary 45 
rovers) and four crewmembers (2 per rover) to conduct a geologic traverse across northern 46 
Arizona while testing continuous and twice-per-day communications paired with operation 47 
modes of separating and exploring individually (Divide & Conquer) and exploring together 48 
(Lead & Follow), respectively. This report provides qualitative conclusions from the geologist 49 
crewmembers involved in this test as to how these modes of communications and operations 50 
affected our ability to conduct field geology. Each mode of communication and operation 51 
provided beneficial capabilities that might be further explored for future Human Spaceflight 52 
Missions to other solar system objects. We find that more frequent interactions between crews 53 
and an Apollo-style Science Team on the Earth best enables scientific progress during human 54 
exploration. However, during multiple vehicle missions, this communication with an Earth-based 55 
team of scientists, who represent “more minds on the problem”, should not come at the exclusion 56 
of (or significantly decrease) communication between the crewmembers in different vehicles 57 
who have the “eyes on the ground”. Inter-crew communications improved when discussions with 58 
a backroom were infrequent.  Both aspects are critical and cannot be mutually exclusive. 59 
Increased vehicle separation distances best enable encounters with multiple geologic units. 60 
However, seemingly redundant visits by multiple vehicles to the same feature can be utilized to 61 
provide improved process-related observations about the development and modification of the 62 
local terrain.  We consider the value of data management, transfer, and accessibility to be the 63 
most important lesson learned. Crews and backrooms should have access to all data and related 64 
interpretations within the mission in as close to real-time conditions as possible. This ensures 65 
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that while on another planetary surface, crewmembers are as educated as possible with respect to 66 
the observations and data they will need to collect at any moment. 67 
 68 
1. Introduction  69 
 70 
Desert Research And Technology Studies (Desert RATS) is a multi-year series of tests of 71 
NASA hardware and operations deployed in the high desert of Arizona. Conducted annually 72 
since 1997, these activities exercise planetary surface hardware and operations in relatively harsh 73 
conditions where long-distance, multi-day roving traverses are achievable. Such activities not 74 
only test vehicle subsystems, they also stress communications and operations systems and enable 75 
testing of science operations approaches that advance human and robotic surface exploration 76 
capabilities as well as the ability to conduct scientific studies, including field geology. 77 
Desert RATS 2010 tested two crewed, electrically-powered rovers that were designed as first-78 
generation prototypes of small pressurized vehicles. Each rover, or Space Exploration Vehicle 79 
(SEV) [1], provided the internal volume necessary for crewmembers to live and work for periods 80 
of at least 14 days, as was demonstrated during the 2009 field test [2].  The SEVs also enable the 81 
crew to conduct extra vehicular activities (EVAs) through the use of rear-mounted suit ports [2, 82 
3]. The 2010 test was designed to simulate geologic science traverses over a 14-day period 83 
through a volcanic field that is analogous to volcanic terrains observed throughout the Solar 84 
System. 85 
The test was conducted between 31 August and 13 September 2010 and is described in detail 86 
by Kosmo et al. in this issue [4]. Two crewmembers lived in and operated each rover for a week 87 
with a “shift change” on day 7, resulting in a total of eight test subjects for the two-week period. 88 
Each crew consisted of an engineer/commander and a field-experienced geologist. Three of the 89 
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crew commanders were experienced astronauts with at least one Space Shuttle flight. The field 90 
geologists were drawn from the scientific community, including NASA centers and academia, 91 
based on funded and published field expertise.  As such, each rover crew was capable of 92 
providing feedback regarding the effect that different operational modes had on mission 93 
operations and science capabilities as compared to actual spaceflight missions and terrestrial 94 
field geology research. 95 
Here we present the opinions of Desert RATS geologist crewmembers on the effect that 96 
different operational modes had on our overall science productivity during the 2010 traverses.  97 
Unlike other papers presented in this Issue [1, 5,] our results are not quantified or based on 98 
metric analyses Instead, “science productivity” as discussed here is a qualitative assessment 99 
made by the authors from their perspective on working inside the SEV and while on EVA as 100 
compared to our regular field geology projects that support our career research.  We note here 101 
that the authors reached a consensus regarding the points raised in this report.  The goal of this 102 
report is to explain the way in which the crewmembers functioned based on varying the mode of 103 
communication and operation, and how each approach might be best utilized in similarly-104 
designed future spaceflight missions. Differences in the approach to handling the operations and 105 
communications modes among the crews are discussed. Spaceflight constraints will always 106 
hinder planetary fieldwork when compared to traditional terrestrial field science, but our work 107 
strives to ensure that future spaceflight crewmembers are prepared to maximize their scientific 108 
efficiency within those constrained working conditions. 109 
 110 
2. Methods  111 
 112 
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The 2010 test explored different communications and operations modes that we briefly 113 
describe here.  For a more detailed description of the modes tested during Desert RATS 2010 see 114 
Kosmos et al., and Eppler et. al., (both in this issue) [4, 6]. Three days of each week were tested 115 
with the rovers in continuous communications (CC) with mission operations and the science 116 
support teams. Another three days were tested with communications for only ~1 hour in the 117 
morning and ~1 hour at the end of the traverse, called twice-a-day communications (2/Day). 118 
During 2/Day, the SEVs were to remain generally within line-of-sight and in communication 119 
with each other. Constrained by these requirements, the separation distance was < 500 m.  120 
Using two SEVs also enabled the testing of two different operations modes (Figure 1). We 121 
tested an exploration strategy in which the two SEVs executed unique traverses, called divide-122 
and-conquer (D&C). The second mode of operation had the rovers follow one another on the 123 
same traverse, called lead-and-follow (L&F). Each mode of operation was combined with a 124 
communication mode for the field test as discussed in the following section. Matrices were 125 
designed to measure the data quality and exploration productivity of each mode, generally 126 
finding that both improved during CC and D&C [1]. To complement those quantitative analyses, 127 
here we report the opinions of the geologist crewmembers as to which aspects of each mode 128 
were considered advantages and disadvantages in conducting science operations.   129 
 130 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 131 
 132 
Within this report we use several terms for which we provide our intended meaning here. The 133 
Science Team and Science Backroom require distinction. The Science Team is everyone 134 
involved in the science of the Mission. This includes the scientists involved in the pre-Mission 135 
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science planning, as well as those who filled Science Backroom roles during the test and field 136 
scientists who observed the work of the crew during the test.  The Science Backroom is a 137 
subgroup of the Science Team that is devoted to handling science operations for an SEV during a 138 
traverse. Each Science Backroom was led by a Science PI and included personnel dedicated to 139 
various aspects of the work that was underway by crewmembers.  Most Science Team members 140 
cycled through different positions within a Science Backroom, as well as into field observations 141 
roles throughout the test.  As such, the Mission and traverse planners were sometimes located 142 
within a Science Backroom, but were not always present in one or both backrooms. Each SEV 143 
had one dedicated Science Backroom during CC.   144 
We use the terms EVA, Station, drive, and traverse.  An EVA is any situation in which one or 145 
both crew members have egressed, or exited, from the SEV through the suitport and are 146 
conducting science or rover maintenance tasks. A Station is a location, generally predetermined 147 
by the Science Team or the Mission Control Center (MCC), at which the SEV has stopped to 148 
conduct scientific observations or maintenance.  A Station might or might not include an EVA. 149 
A drive involves a SEV moving between Stations.  A traverse is a series of stations and drives.  150 
For example, a daily traverse might contain three Stations, while a crew’s complete seven-day 151 
traverse includes all Stations visited during their portion of the Mission. We also discuss 152 
prebriefings and debriefings, including those among the crews and those between crews and with 153 
the Science Backroom or MCC.  A prebriefing is a meeting between relevant parties prior to an 154 
action, such as an EVA or the day’s overall activities.  A debriefing is a similar meeting held 155 
after the activity is complete.  When discussing both types of meetings in a general way we use 156 
the word “briefings”. Prebriefings and debriefings, and their purposes, are discussed in additional 157 
detail by Love and Bleacher [7] in this issue.  158 
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 159 
3. Crew Daily Science Activities  160 
 161 
The 2010 Desert RATS field campaign operated under two operations/communications mode 162 
combinations: D&C with CC; and L&F with 2/Day.  The Mission was designed to assess each 163 
operation and communication mode independently, and no Mission-level goals included the 164 
assessment of paired modes.  As such, we did not operate under each possible combination of 165 
operations and communications modes.  The actual combinations were, in part, chosen for safety 166 
reasons because when not in communication with the MCC and Science Backroom the SEVs 167 
needed to be in close proximity for hazard and emergency mitigation, which essentially 168 
eliminated the possible combination of D&C and 2/Day. CC and L&F were not paired at any 169 
time during the 2010 field test. Although these test modes were assessed independently, we 170 
present our observations and conclusions in the paired format in which the field test was 171 
conducted.  172 
Within these modes of operation the science team and crew worked together to develop 173 
geologic hypotheses that could be tested with field observations that were enabled by the 174 
mobility of the SEV and EVA capabilities of the crew [8, 9].  The ultimate goal of the 2010 175 
Desert RATS field campaign was to identify ways to best preserve idealized – and, perhaps, 176 
“traditional” – terrestrial field capabilities within a constrained human spaceflight environment.  177 
In this section we describe the daily science activities within each combination of 178 
communications and operations modes. Each combination resulted in distinctive test outcomes, 179 
each of which would have unique relevance to different styles of missions and approaches to 180 
scientific data collection. For instance, missions to Mars or asteroids are unlikely to experience 181 
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CC, therefore preparation for dealing with delayed or limited communications is critical 182 
regardless of the operations mode that might selected. 183 
 184 
3.1 Continuous Communications and Divide-and-Conquer 185 
Activities performed by an individual SEV crew and their Science Backroom during CC 186 
essentially adopted a strategy similar to that used by the 2009 crews and Science Backrooms [2, 187 
10]. During this portion of the test, the operations mode enabled the SEVs to spread out and 188 
cover more ground (Figure 1). This capability supported the exploration and collection of 189 
samples from a more diverse set of geologic units. Furthermore, CC enabled us to continuously 190 
work with a host of scientists in the backroom to develop, in real-time, hypotheses that might be 191 
testable within an ongoing EVA, traverse, or during the course of the entire mission [6]. The 192 
Science Backroom worked continuously with MCC to maintain a balance between science 193 
objectives and changes to the daily timeline, in part, necessitated by delays during drives or 194 
EVAs and other operational constraints.  Regular updates were provided to the crew regarding 195 
their timeline by the Science Backroom and MCC so that neither crewmember within an SEV 196 
was required to focus significant attention to changes in the timeline.  Therefore the geologist 197 
crewmember, in particular, was free to focus on geologic descriptions during drives. The 198 
backroom was also able to provide support to the crew by indicating when the image data or 199 
sample description information was not adequate (e.g. poor sample placement within the image 200 
frame, the lack of specific information from a sample description, etc.), thereby enabling the 201 
crew to take corrective measures. This was particularly critical during EVAs in the 2010 test 202 
because the crews were unable to see the image and video data that they were collecting [11].  203 
Prior to the beginning of an EVA, each rover’s crew would hold a short prebriefing amongst 204 
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themselves to lay out a specific exploration and sample collection strategy for that site.  During 205 
CC, the science support team was able to weigh in on this briefing, but, in general, gave the crew 206 
the final decision-making authority for specific Station parking spot selection and EVA plan 207 
development.  This represents a lesson learned from the 2009 field test during which pre-208 
acquired robotic rover data sometimes led to tension between the Science Backroom and crew. 209 
On occasion during the 2009 test, the Backroom questioned the real-time site selection and 210 
sample location decisions of the crew because of occasional discrepancies between the robotic 211 
reconnaissance data and what the crew was seeing real-time.  During the 2010 field test, the 212 
Science Backroom had access to prior data collected from other sites, the geologic map, and, 213 
based on images acquired from a camera mounted on the SEV’s mast, a wider field of view than 214 
the crew.  The Science Backroom could use these data as references to help direct an EVA, 215 
whereas the crew could not access any of those data in real-time while on EVA. CC also enabled 216 
the backroom to operate the SEV-mounted cameras during EVAs to document the surrounding 217 
terrain or keep track of the crew’s activities, including the collection of geologic observations 218 
and samples [12]. 219 
Although we found communications with the Science Backroom to be beneficial, we did 220 
identify some drawbacks. To reduce the overlap in communications between two SEVs and their 221 
respective Science Backrooms, the Desert RATS team placed each SEV on a separate 222 
communications loop. Although the SEVs had a voice loop for communications between one 223 
another during drives or IVA (Internal Vehicular Activity) operations, it was not the default 224 
configuration.  In practice, we found that communications between SEVs during the CC 225 
traverses were limited because it was logistically difficult to enable the communications link. 226 
Furthermore, in order to initiate communication with the other SEV during IVA, the crews were 227 
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required to ask permission from the MCC. For this reason, the geologist crewmembers never 228 
communicated between rovers during the week 1 CC days. During week 2, the geologist 229 
crewmembers did communicate during CC, but only rarely and informally. In addition, it was 230 
not possible, in either of the communications modes, for an IVA crew of one SEV to initiate 231 
communication with the other crew while the other crew was on EVA.  Because EVA schedules 232 
often did not overlap, or changes in the timeline caused planned overlaps to become out of sync, 233 
significant periods of time were therefore essentially inter-SEV communication blackouts. As 234 
such, we describe inter-SEV communications during CC as difficult. We made up for this on-235 
the-ground communications deficiency by holding unscheduled 30-60 minute SEV-to-SEV 236 
debriefs daily during crew personal time, typically at the end of the day. However, this approach 237 
negates the potential benefit of each crewmember’s complete awareness of the other’s 238 
observations and hypotheses in real-time, which would have been scientifically and operationally 239 
advantageous during daily activities, and completely eliminated the Science Backroom from the 240 
discussion.  241 
 242 
3.2 Twice-a-Day Communications and Lead and Follow  243 
The 2/Day and L&F scenarios were new test variables for the DRATS field tests.  During 244 
2/Day and L&F operations, the crew took on a significantly increased responsibility for timeline 245 
management. At the end of the morning prebriefings, the crews were told at what time that 246 
evening they were expected to reestablish communications with the MCC. Once the SEVs ended 247 
communication with the MCC, the crews were responsible for ensuring that the science 248 
objectives were met within the time available for that day’s traverse. The first step towards doing 249 
so was effective timeline management, which added to the crew workload as they did not have 250 
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MCC to manage this activity. Each SEV crew conducted timeline management independently as 251 
a means of redundancy, thereby enabling cross-checking between SEV crews for this important 252 
activity. If time was lost along the day’s traverse, the crews were responsible for determining in 253 
real-time how best to preserve the rest of the day’s science objectives within the shortened 254 
timeline. This task included decisions in which lower priority science objectives were dropped to 255 
ensure that higher priority objectives could be met.  To help minimize the added responsibility 256 
on the crews during 2/Day, the morning Science Team prebriefs evolved throughout the 2010 257 
field test to include a detailed prioritized list of Station objectives. This helped decrease crew 258 
time spent adjusting the daily science plan to the evolving timeline. During the second week of 259 
the test, the Science Team prebriefs continued to evolve to include a “big picture” science 260 
overview that linked the day’s objectives to the observations and lessons learned throughout the 261 
previously completed traverse days. This development provided the crews with some context to 262 
better judge the importance of previously prioritized tasks, and this improved our real-time 263 
decision making capabilities. 264 
Because 2/Day communications limited the interactions between the SEV crews and the 265 
Science Team and MCC, the daily activities of the crews were not closely monitored [6].  266 
Furthermore, because the week 1 crews did not provide an operational debrief to the week 2 267 
crews, neither week’s crewmembers had a preconception as to how to conduct their 2/Day and 268 
L&F operations within the Flight Rule constraints [6].  As such, during 2/Day and L&F 269 
operations each week’s crews developed a unique approach to conducting a traverse under these 270 
conditions.  Those differences, as well as their unique strengths, are outlined in the following 271 
paragraphs.  As is the theme throughout this report, we show that each approach holds 272 
advantages that should be preserved in future operations tests and Space Flight Missions.   273 
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In general, L&F operations kept the SEVs within line-of-sight and rarely exceeded 500 m of 274 
separation.  Although the phrase Lead and Follow suggests that the SEVs would operate in close 275 
proximity at all times, the stations that were planned for each crew by the Science Team were 276 
often several hundred meters apart. As such, the crews for each pair of SEVs developed their 277 
own strategy for working together both during drives and at Stations.  The primary differences 278 
between the week 1 and week 2 strategies were associated with real-time Station selection and 279 
drives between them.  Week 1 crews conducted all of their drives in a closely spaced formation, 280 
but separated to farther extents during Station selection without necessarily attempting to reach 281 
the specified site that was planned by the Science Team. Week 2 crews conducted their drives in 282 
a less strict spatial formation but attempted to reach the Station sites that were planned for them.  283 
During CC the crews received continual input from the Science Backroom regarding Station 284 
selection and drive locations, but during 2/Day and L&F the crews depended on each other to 285 
make those decisions.  Despite these differences within L&F, both crews operated within the 286 
constraints that were designed for the field test during L&F operations. These differences 287 
highlight the importance of field tests as these unique styles enable unique capabilities that are 288 
not necessarily easily planned from an office.  289 
During week 1, the SEVs remained relatively close to one another during L&F drives 290 
generally a few 10s of meters apart (Figure 1).  Upon nearing a Station, the SEV crews would 291 
discuss the best sampling and site selection strategy.  Because week 1 crews always drove in 292 
close formation this usually involved reaching a point between the Stations that were planned by 293 
the Science Team (often 200-300 m separation).  The SEVs would then split off towards their 294 
respective Stations while conducting regular radio checks to ensure that communications were 295 
maintained.  At a given Station, the crew with the highest priority objective usually chose a 296 
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parking location first that enabled them to address that goal, and the crew with lower priority 297 
objectives would select a parking spot that maintained communication with the other SEV but 298 
provided the opportunity to conduct the most effective field work. If the geologist crewmembers 299 
believed that they would likely sample the same material, and either crew could identify an 300 
alternative Station nearby that would enable sampling of an unexplored unit that was 301 
unrecognized by prior analysis of remote sensing data, then the lower priority tasks were 302 
dropped and a real-time decision was made to explore the new unit (see Hurtado et al. [12] this 303 
issue for more details on geologic fieldwork strategies during EVAs). Prior to the first crew’s 304 
start of an EVA, both SEV crews would determine at what time their ingress into the SEV at the 305 
end of their EVA should begin such that both SEVs could meet at an agreed upon rendezvous 306 
point at the same time to begin the next drive in close formation. In other words, crew agreement 307 
upon the time for ingress initiation was a critical decision point during week 1. If the geologists 308 
determined that a site that was different from the one selected by the Science Team was to be 309 
explored, then their crew was responsible for ensuring that their ingress after EVA began at the 310 
time necessary to accommodate the SEV rendezvous. This approach always kept the SEVs 311 
within a few 10s of meters during a drive, which had some advantages as described below. We 312 
refer to this L&F tactic as “Paired Exploration”. 313 
During week 2 the crews generally adopted a strategy in which the SEVs attempted to park at 314 
or near the predetermined Station locations (in as much as was safely and logistically possible, 315 
similar to selecting a parking spot during D&C). The week 2 crews also held prebriefings to 316 
determine EVA durations and ingress times, but were less regimented in identifying a post-EVA 317 
rendezvous point and time.  Because neither SEV was expected to wait for the other at a 318 
rendezvous point before the drive to the next station, this approach enabled the SEVs to travel at 319 
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a separation distance of up to ~100 meters opposed to ~10-40 meters as was typical of the Paired 320 
Exploration strategy utilized in week 1.  As such, week 2 crews took less authority to choose a 321 
specific parking location unique from the traverse plan, but did spread out during drives enabling 322 
unique observations from each crew.  We tentatively refer to week 2 crews L&F tactic as “Recon 323 
Exploration”, and it had unique advantages as described below. 324 
Regardless of the Exploration style they used, Paired or Recon, the crews were always in 325 
close enough proximity to provide situational awareness feedback to each other. This was 326 
advantageous when crossing rough terrain, such as gullies, during which the SEV in front could 327 
find the safest path and relay that information to the trailing SEV.  Similarly, the trailing SEV 328 
could reach higher ground and provide descriptions of the path ahead to the lead SEV to help 329 
them select a path. This was done nearly continuously as the geologist crew members discussed 330 
the geology and the crew commanders discussed how to traverse across it.  331 
The crews worked together during IVA operations on the L&F traverses to acquire data that 332 
was complementary and did not repeat observations at a station. During CC and D&C 333 
operations, a SEV crew would sometimes collect Crew Field Notes (CFNs) [11, 12], typically 334 
consisting of a single image from a camera mounted on the SEV’s mast and a recorded voice 335 
note. Since the SEVs were at different Stations during D&C, each crew’s CFNs and Panoramic 336 
images were unique, and crews had to spend time acquiring both sets of data, or only acquire one 337 
data type.  During 2/Day and L&F Paired Exploration operations, the SEV crews worked in 338 
concert such that one SEV crew would collect a CFN at a stop while the other SEV further 339 
documented the area with a GigaPan (self stitching panorama from a second camera mounted on 340 
the SEV mast) [13] that was simultaneously acquired and included the SEV that was collecting a 341 
CFN image of a smaller scale feature. This style of complementary IVA data collection provided 342 
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improved geologic context for CFN data, as opposed to a single CFN or GigaPan image acquired 343 
by a solitary SEV. This adaptation was a logical step as the collection of a CFN by one SEV 344 
essentially forced the other SEV to stop and wait during Paired Exploration, and this potentially 345 
wasted idle time was put to good use.  346 
During Recon Exploration, the SEV crews did not wait for each other, either at a rendezvous 347 
point or during CFN image acquisition. As such, potentially wasted waiting time was minimized 348 
or eliminated entirely. In situations when one crew completed their EVA earlier than their 349 
partners, the first crew pressed forward on the traverse. Although this style of exploration never 350 
resulted in significant separation, and the crews were not operating independently of one another, 351 
this enabled the lead crew to scout out or recon the best path for the following SEV’s drive or 352 
sites for image acquisition.  As such, the first SEV crew was able to provide advice on pathway 353 
and parking spot selection.  However, in cases when the SEVs during week 2 were separated by 354 
greater distances than during week 1, the local, precise situational awareness enabled by Paired 355 
Exploration was reduced when crossing difficult terrain.  Greater separation distances also 356 
prohibited the Recon Exploration crews from acquiring complementary CFN and GigaPan data. 357 
However, it is not clear how advantageous these data were/are to the Science Team. Perhaps not 358 
all CFNs would experience an increase in value when complemented with a GigaPan.  This 359 
represents a possible trade study for future tests in which L&F operations are considered. These 360 
differences only recently came to light, due to the preparation of this report, and, as such, are still 361 
being considered by the Science Team. This point demonstrates the importance of preparing 362 
reports such as those in this Special Issue to help draw out possibly overlooked real-time test 363 
adaptations and outcomes. 364 
As mentioned above, L&F operations, regardless of Paired or Recon Exploration approaches, 365 
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often led to repetitive sampling of the same geologic units as the traverse Stations regularly 366 
restricted the crew to the same area. This could be viewed, albeit problematically, as a 367 
disadvantage in that we covered less ground and explored fewer units [12]. Conversely we found 368 
that while working with the other SEV we were able to conduct more detailed process-related 369 
observations. An example involved a gully that had eroded into the base of a cone (Figure 2). 370 
 371 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 372 
 373 
During EVA both crews crossed the gully at ~ 300 m separation and were able to determine the 374 
amount of incision and gully widening over that distance. A stop at the same location during 375 
D&C would have collected one set of the same samples and observations, but may have provided 376 
little input on the erosion process other than that it had occurred.  377 
During 2/Day we communicated nearly continuously between SEVs. Although CC interaction 378 
with a backroom enabled more experienced minds to work on a science problem, having two sets 379 
of trained eyes on the same terrain also proved advantageous. During both Paired and Recon 380 
Exploration, the crew geologists were able to discuss their observations and hypotheses 381 
throughout the traverse. This enabled the crew to quickly compare results, both prior to and after 382 
EVAs, enabling improved Station selection and EVA planning. This sort of real-time traverse 383 
refinement informed by first-hand analysis in the field is not possible with a remote science team 384 
and was a benefit to executing efficient and scientifically effective EVAs. Similarly, the two 385 
geologists could, when practical on L&F days, convene on the outcrop during EVAs in order to 386 
compare samples and observations.  This was an effective way of synthesizing geologic 387 
understanding while still in a position to make additional observations. Having communicated 388 
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throughout the day’s traverse reduced the amount of time spent discussing work during crew 389 
personal time at the end of the day. However, during 2/Day we found that the scheduled ~60 min 390 
science debriefs at the end of the day were not adequate to convey our daily observations and 391 
hypotheses to the science team. This could essentially represent a loss of data between crew and 392 
backroom at some points, particularly if there are bottlenecks or points-of-failure in the 393 
automated transfer of digital files between the SEV and Science Team. This highlights the need 394 
for effective data flow between all parties. Regardless of operation or communication mode, we 395 
collected annotated GigaPan images, maintained spreadsheets, and documented the traverse with 396 
text documents from inside the SEV [12]. However, it was not always clear to us which of these 397 
files were transferred, received, and analyzed by the Science Team prior to each morning’s 398 
prebrief.  399 
 400 
4. Findings and Recommendations  401 
 402 
The 2010 Desert RATS field test essentially represents a set of “end-member” communication 403 
and operational modes that could be used during dual rover planetary exploration. In the 404 
preceding section we discussed differences in the daily science operations within the SEVs 405 
during the traverse.  Both operations and communications modalities pose advantages and 406 
disadvantages to the geologist crewmembers and their ability to collect scientific data.  Based on 407 
the geologist crewmembers’ experiences managing these challenges, we present 408 
recommendations for how to maximize the science capabilities of future surface exploration 409 
missions that might utilize some variants of these end-member cases.    We note that despite the 410 
limitations of a given operations or communications mode, the crew, Science Team, and MCC 411 
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adapted quickly to best exploit the advantages present within the operations test.  We believe this 412 
to be consistent with all human spaceflight endeavors, and it highlights the necessity of realistic 413 
analog tests and training prior to Mission activities. No lesson learned during an analog test is 414 
insignificant.  Any experience-based method for streamlining the adaptation pathway towards 415 
maximizing the value of science or mission operations activities within a given set of limitations 416 
is highly valuable, even if it is not realized for years or even decades. 417 
It is important to recognize that the crew is but one portion of the Science Team.  The ultimate 418 
science goal of any mission is to provide the most thorough scientific understanding possible of 419 
an area of exploration.  In the case of Apollo, much of this overall understanding was not 420 
achieved for years to decades afterwards [14], and continues to this day.  As such, the goal is not 421 
necessarily that the crew themselves gain that understanding in real-time, but that they work with 422 
the Science Team to collect the most important data to enable both real-time and continued 423 
science in the years to follow.  After all, the hypothesis development that drives scientific 424 
advances does not end with the mission.  However, to ensure that the correct data are acquired, 425 
the crew must be involved in hypothesis development and have as clear an understanding of the 426 
overall science as everyone else on the Science Team. 427 
With this in mind, the geology crewmembers generally agree that a better overall scientific 428 
understanding of the 2010 test region was ultimately gained during CC and D&C.  When the 429 
Science Team was given time to ingest and compare results from both rovers over a larger area 430 
of exploration, a more complete scientific story resulted.  However, we also felt that we had a 431 
better personal recognition of the larger science story in real-time when we communicated with 432 
our partner SEV’s crew regularly during 2/Day activities.  This point is discussed by Litaker and 433 
Howard (this issue) [5] based on metric data analysis of the crew’s experience.  They state: 434 
20 
 
“Interestingly, during debrief sessions; (sic) the crew reported in 2/Day they had a better 435 
understanding of the bigger scientific picture than in CC due to the communications between the 436 
science members of the crew.”  Consistent with our discussion above, we clarify this point here 437 
by stating that, with respect to communications, we found value in real-time access to the 438 
knowledge gained by the other crew geologist.  However, while this led to an improved personal 439 
understanding of the regional science, ultimately the overall science understanding gained during 440 
the mission was best maximized during CC with additional scientists in the backroom. 441 
Furthermore, potential loss of data during 2/Day was a genuine risk as the crew were not able to 442 
update the Science Backroom about their thoughts and observations in real-time. As such, data 443 
could be truly lost in this communications mode. This point highlights the importance of 444 
ensuring that the crew are kept, as best as possible, in the loop regarding hypothesis and science 445 
story development including data from both SEVs during the daily pre- and debriefs. We also 446 
reiterate that the Science Team was aware of this issue throughout the 2010 test as evidenced by 447 
the continually improving briefing strategies outlined in Section 3.2.  This point also clearly 448 
demonstrates that both end-member communications modes hold some value that might be 449 
usefully incorporated into future Space Flight Missions. We discuss this point further in the 450 
following paragraphs.  451 
We note here that, although the test included a CC scenario, at no point did we truly 452 
experience continuous communications with MCC or the Science Backroom due to difficulties in 453 
deploying test assets to maintain communications in a terrain with significant relief.  We found it 454 
easier to operate when planning for intermittent communications than to expect CC but, in 455 
reality, experience intermittent communications. As a result, we recommend that a series of 456 
fallback communications protocols should be established to deal with loss of signal situations, 457 
21 
 
particularly because continuous communication is not likely to exist for a mission to most 458 
planetary surfaces. During CC in week 2, the SEVs crew did begin creating a form of fallback 459 
plan by discussing the goals of the upcoming EVA during each EVA debrief. This turned out to 460 
be useful in one instance where the crew lost communications with their Science Backroom prior 461 
to arriving at a Station, the exact time when the prebrief would typically have been underway.  462 
Based on the communications tests we feel that the best overall science was achieved when 463 
more brains were working on the science problems. Ideally we prefer regular communications 464 
with a Science Backroom to help develop competing hypotheses and tests to differentiate 465 
between them. When not in regular communications with a Science Backroom, the crew relied 466 
heavily upon inter-SEV discussions to increase the value of our science results as compared to 467 
working in complete isolation. However, even if near-continuous communications with the 468 
Science Backroom are achievable, we still recommend that the crews should be provided time in 469 
the schedule to communicate among each other during a traverse. Perhaps this will require 470 
developments in communications infrastructure to enable multiple loops that allow simultaneous 471 
communications without interference. Lacking such a development, the MCC and Science Team 472 
must understand that this type of inter-crew communication is mission critical, and not an action 473 
to be occasionally accommodated. As mentioned earlier, having multiple personnel working in 474 
the Science Backroom is beneficial, but so is having a second set of eyes on the ground and a 475 
resultant increased contextual understanding of the area of exploration. Neither completely 476 
replaces the value of the other and the advantages of both should be preserved even when 477 
operating in near-continuous communications with a Science Team. 478 
To ensure flow of information between rovers (and their Science Backrooms) the concept of a 479 
single Mission Science Principal Investigator (PI), with oversight of both SEV teams (crews and 480 
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Science Backrooms), should be explored. During the 2010 test, the Science Backrooms were 481 
located in adjacent rooms, but science communications between them were informal and 482 
sporadic [6].  During CC, our communications between SEV crews were also minimized so as 483 
not to interfere with EVAs or ongoing discussions between the other crew and their Science 484 
Backroom.  The Mission Science PI would be responsible for developing the overall science 485 
story for the mission so that neither SEV team is working in isolation as a consequence of trying 486 
to reduce the impact of too many voices speaking simultaneously on communications loops. 487 
During this test, the data collected while on EVA [12], including imagery, video, and voice, 488 
were generally not available to the crews for review.  Young et al. (this issue) [11] recommends 489 
that, at the very least, crew members should be able to monitor their camera status in real-time, 490 
which is a capability that has already been added for the 2011 Desert RATS field test.  Here we 491 
additionally recommend that all data should be available between SEV crews, and ultimately 492 
between EVA crewmembers in real-time.  Regardless of data display and sharing capabilities, 493 
the Mission Science PI would ensure that all crew and Science Backroom participants are aware 494 
of relevant observations from their counterparts throughout the traverse, and that neither team is 495 
working in isolation. 496 
In addition to a Mission Science PI, we recommend that a geology-trained crewmember 497 
should be identified as a Field Science PI in much the same way that an overall Crew 498 
Commander is identified between the SEVs.  The Field Science PI should have final decision-499 
making authority on the ground. The Field Science PI would be most important when 500 
communications are limited to several times per day opposed to CC. Although we did not 501 
encounter a problem in this aspect of the test during 2/Day, it is obvious that somebody should 502 
have overall science decision-making authority on the ground, particularly when the crew are 503 
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responsible for maintaining their own timeline and when Stations and EVA plans might need to 504 
be modified or dropped entirely.  505 
We feel that the daily science debriefs during 2/Day did not enable us to adequately convey 506 
our scientific lessons learned from the day’s traverse, thereby limiting the overall science learned 507 
during the mission. This point highlights the importance of science debriefs during limited 508 
communications situations between the crew and Science Backroom. The format of this 509 
discussion was not well developed prior to the field test and evolved as the test progressed, but 510 
we suggest that it should be significantly structured so that the crew can easily, succinctly, and 511 
completely convey the important aspects of their day’s traverse. Additionally, the point of 512 
contact that represents the Science Backroom to the crew should remain consistent and have a 513 
strong working knowledge of the day’s activities and results. One possibility would be that the 514 
science debrief is led by the Field Science PI.  That individual would synthesize and summarize 515 
both SEV’s results prior to the meeting and then present this to the Mission Science PI during the 516 
briefing itself, as opposed to each geologist crewmember discussing their own, possibly 517 
redundant, observations. Furthermore, if real-time interactions are possible during briefings it 518 
would be beneficial if the crew and Science Team could interactively view and annotate the 519 
same data.  520 
In order to maximize the efficiency of the daily prebriefs and debriefs, the data flow 521 
framework must be clearly understood between the SEVs and their Science Backrooms. This 522 
was particularly important during 2/D.  The crew often created what was essentially a science 523 
abstract for the day’s traverse, including new hypotheses and answers to questions that had been 524 
raised by the science team in the morning prebrief. However, sometimes this information was not 525 
received by the backroom due to uncertainty as to where digital data was to be stored in the SEV 526 
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computer system for upload/download and a lack of a mechanism for explicitly indicating if and 527 
when those data were transferred.  In these instances, confusion arose between the crew and their 528 
Science Backrooms because it was not clear which data had been transferred and particularly 529 
which data had been included in briefing discussions.  As such, we recommend that science 530 
prebriefings should always indicate what data were used in the development of that presentation.  531 
Furthermore, a standard set of daily data products should be expected and documentation should 532 
be kept to indicate where those data should reside and when those data have or have not been 533 
transferred.  To address these issues, a dedicated data manager position with data transfer 534 
oversight should exist on the Science Team. We also reiterate here the point that data should also 535 
be easily transferrable between the SEVs and that the crews should have access to all the data 536 
that they have collected throughout their traverse, something that was not possible during Desert 537 
RATS 2010. 538 
Early in the test, the morning science briefings focused heavily on sample collection 539 
objectives. As the test progressed, the morning science briefings began providing us with the 540 
geologic hypotheses that drove the sample requirements. Inclusion of the crew in the hypothesis 541 
development and data collection planning process is critical for maintaining the crew’s focus on 542 
science goals.  Although the Science PI (a position that existed within each Science Backroom 543 
during the 2010 test, such that each SEV had a Science PI) was located with the Science Team, 544 
the crews were the eyes on the ground.  Providing the crews with the current hypotheses and 545 
tests (samples, observations, and other data) to differentiate between them ensures that the goals 546 
of the Science PI will be met.  This is an interaction between the crews and their Science 547 
Backrooms that did improve throughout the traverse regardless of operating or communication 548 
mode.  However, during CC the backroom was capable of updating the crew in real-time about 549 
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hypothesis development, whereas during 2/Day the crew were solely responsible for real-time 550 
hypothesis development and testing, and as such the Science Team were updated twice-per-day.  551 
As such, the importance of the daily science prebrief increases dramatically when 552 
communication opportunities decrease within a given mission day, and the structure of the 553 
prebrief might be fundamentally different depending on the frequency of communications during 554 
the day and the length of time available during the meeting. 555 
Regardless of the operations mode for a mission, traverse design is a critical component as the 556 
traverse is essentially the scientific backbone upon which the mission is built.  As such, traverse 557 
design should be led by a PI who will be in the Science Backroom during its execution, 558 
potentially occupying the role of Mission Science PI as discussed above. It is critical that this 559 
person have an intimate understanding of the traverse for real-time decision making for both 560 
rovers based on the collection of new data. Furthermore, it is critical that the crew and the daily 561 
brief/debrief leads also possess an intimate understanding of the daily traverse plans, which is 562 
most easily established through involvement in traverse plan development. 563 
 564 
5. Conclusions 565 
 566 
Many Solar System targets have been identified for possible human exploration missions in 567 
the future, and these choices are based on numerous scientific rationales.  Regardless of the 568 
destinations that are chosen, the humans who explore these locations will be faced with many 569 
operational constraints on their ability to conduct scientific analyses. Although science will be a 570 
significant driver of future human exploration, safety concerns and physical limitations will 571 
largely control the frequency and duration of delays in communications between crews and 572 
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supporting scientists back on Earth. This will also determine the allowable separation distances 573 
between assets and the mode of operation among multiple spacecraft assets, both robotic and 574 
crewed.  As such, we do not suggest that any of the modes of operation tested during Desert 575 
RATS 2010 is an obvious better option, as it is not clear what the cost of those capabilities might 576 
be that could offset their potential advantage.  All modes that were tested in the 2010 Desert 577 
RATS field campaign revealed limitations in our capabilities as field geologists when compared 578 
to the standard terrestrial fieldwork with which we are most accustomed.  However, each mode 579 
of operation that was tested did provide unique advantages.  Our goal is to highlight those 580 
advantages so that when technological constraints are placed on future human explorers, they are 581 
mitigated using an approach that maximizes scientific efficiency within that architecture.   582 
We find that regular communications between the crews and their supporting scientists 583 
enables the most effective real-time hypothesis development and testing throughout a traverse.  584 
However, the communication infrastructure established for the 2010 test did not enable adequate 585 
communication between crews, an equally critical capability to have.  When communications 586 
with the Science Backroom were infrequent, the crews relied heavily upon each other for real-587 
time hypothesis development.  As such, both communications modes that were tested in 2010 588 
lead us to conclude that communications with a backroom on a regular basis are important, but 589 
that discussions between geology-trained crewmembers should not be lost in order to achieve 590 
this capability. Having more minds working on the problem is important, but so are discussions 591 
between those who have the eyes on the ground. Both are important and should not be mutually 592 
exclusive.  In fact, we argue that they are likely mutually advantageous. 593 
Different separation distance between crews and rovers can enable unique and beneficial 594 
capabilities. Larger separation distances between rovers during a dual (or more) vehicle mission 595 
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enables the crews to spread out and cover more ground.  This capability provides opportunities 596 
for crews to encounter, explore, and sample a more diverse set of geologic units, thereby 597 
exposing the science team to a broader, more regional understanding of the exploration target. 598 
Although a decreased separation distance might reduce the likelihood of the mission 599 
encountering different geologic units, closer proximity observations at times during the 2010 test 600 
provided higher detail process-related understandings of the local geology.  601 
Regardless of the mode of operations and communications, the need for competent data 602 
management, transfer, and accessibility in real-time is consistently a lesson learned. Multiple-603 
rover missions require data sharing capabilities between the crews, encompassing quantified 604 
measurements, sample information, observations, and hypothesis development.  In situations 605 
where multiple vehicles will each have a dedicated Science Backroom it is critical that one 606 
person on the mission’s Science Team be responsible for integrating each rover’s data and 607 
interpretations into the overall science story.  Furthermore, that story must always be shared with 608 
the crews who might not have had a chance to fully recognize the value of the other crew’s 609 
observations during a traverse.  An observation or sample from one rover might be the critical 610 
piece of information that drives an important realization by the other rover. 611 
Analog tests, such as the Desert RATS 2010 field campaign, represent the opportunity to 612 
collect critical operational data related to potential future solar system exploration missions.  613 
Although no analog test can fully capture the specific and complex set of architectural 614 
constraints that will eventually face the humans who explore other planets, satellites, or 615 
asteroids, we can begin to outline the methods in which we might best work within those likely 616 
constraints. Even more important is the identification of unrecognized difficulties so that we 617 
might begin incorporating them into future analog tests. In this context, we conclude that the 618 
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2010 test was a success, but is just one step in a series of many that are needed in the future to 619 
best enable human exploration of our solar system. 620 
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Figure Captions 683 
 684 
Figure 1. The top image shows a portion of the San Francisco Volcanic Field, including S P 685 
Crater and Colton Crater (data product credited to Google). This region was the site for the 2010 686 
Desert RATS field test. The dashed line denotes the extent of the images at the bottom left and 687 
right. The panels labeled D&C and L&F show the same areas.  The colored lines show the 688 
traverse paths followed by SEV A (red line) and SEV B (blue line) during different operations 689 
modes. The lines are based on the GPS navigational data collected by the SEVs during their 690 
traverses. D&C data were collected on 9/1/2010 by the week 1 crews and L&F data were 691 
collected on 9/12/2010 by the week 2 crews. 692 
 693 
Figure 2. Images A and B are example still images that were acquired as CFNs (Crew Field 694 
Notes) using the crewmembers’ backpack cameras during 2/Day EVAs [12] within L&F 695 
operations.  These images were obtained at the locations marked A and B on the map at the 696 
bottom of the figure.  The orange and red lines show the rover paths for SEV A and SEV B, 697 
respectively. The green and blue lines show the EVA paths for the geologist crewmembers from 698 
SEV A and SEV B, respectively. The dashed black line shows the trend of a small gully that has 699 
formed at the base of a cinder cone. Although the primary science objectives at this location 700 
were to collect samples of the cone and the loosely consolidated surface materials around it, 701 
analysis of the CFN data shows that the gully dimensions vary from ~ 2 m wide and 10-30 cm 702 
deep at point B to ~ 3 m wide and 1 m deep at point A.  This type of process-related, 703 
observational data contributes to the science value of a Station [13]. However, we note the 704 
potential difficulties in estimating scale from context images of the local geology (A). Unlike 705 
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traditional field work, it is not always easy to deploy a physical item for scale at some distance 706 
from the site at which the crew acquire images of the local geology. These data were acquired on 707 
9/4/2010.  708 
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